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tion of a subsidiary policy to make variations in a fine depend on the nature
of the violation. If fines could be deducted the loss occasioned by the fine
would vary according to the tax bracket of the violator, whether he had net
income for the year, and his loss carryover and carryback position-purely
fortuitous circumstances from the state's point of view. Of course, the state
could make its system of fines dependent on the federal income tax law; but
this might be too complicated, if only because federal tax laws change so
rapidly. Disallowance of deductions for fines seems preferable, 49 if the lack of
statutory justification for such a course is to be disregarded.
In accordance with the language of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Sullivan case,
another line of distinction might be suggested. One criticism of cases disallowing deduction on the grounds of illegality has been that it is not the function
of the federal government to enforce state criminal law.50 It may be that the
distinction between fines and other expenses implicit in the Tank Truck and
Sullivan cases reflects this concern for federal-state relations. Thus disallowance of deduction for fines merely aids an enforcement which has already
taken place, rather than constituting independent enforcement of state law.
However, problems of federalism would not be raised by disallowance of deduction for expenses incurred in connection with violation of federal law.
Thus a double line of distinction may emerge from the Sullivan, Tank Truck,
and Hoover cases: where violation of state law is involved, only deduction of
fines will be disallowed; where federal law is violated, the prior case law will
be followed.
41The cost of an unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution is an exception to the suggested rule of allowing deduction of all expenditures other than penalties. Litigation costs are
likely to be closer to the magnitude of fines than of wage and rent expenditures. Thus, although
it may be difficult to conceal a large portion of the litigation expenses, disallowance of such
expenses would probably not discourage filing of returns. Moreover, no substantial administrative problems are involved in determining when litigation expenses have been incurred, and a
policy of disallowance would not give the Commissioner the broad discretion to which the
Court in the Lilly case seemed to object. However, although the disallowance of fines frustrates state policy to make the violator poorer by the amount of the fine, there is no comparable
policy regarding litigation expenses.
50See Paul, op. cit. supra note 21.

THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACTS-DISTRIBUTION OF RISK BETWEEN A CONCURRENTLY NEGLIGENT EMPLOYER AND THIRD PARTY
Where the concurrent negligence of an employer and a third party cause
injury to an employee, the majority of courts have made the third party bear
the whole of the liability.' Thus, in suits against third parties by subrogated
1 (a) Subrogee-emrployerv. ThirdParty Cases:Aetna Casualty & S. Co. v. Manufacturers Cas.
Ins. Co., 140 F.Supp. 579 (W.D. La., 1956); Cyr v. F. S. Payne Co., 112 F.Supp. 526 (D. Conn.,
1953); Nyquist v. Batcher, 235 Minn. 491, 51 N.W.2d 566 (1952); Milosevich v. Pacific
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Electric Ry. Co., 68 Cal.App. 662, 230 Pac. 15 (1924). See also cases listed in 2 Larson, The
Law of Workmen's Compensation §75.23 n. 80 (1952). Contra: American Casualty Co. v. South
Carolina Gas Co., 124 F.Supp. 30 (W.D.S.C., 1954); Liddle v. Collins Construstion Co., 283
S.W.2d 474 (Mo., 1955); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Cal. Electric Works, 29 Cal.App.2d 260,
84 P.2d 313 (1938). See also cases listed in 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation
§75.23 n. 81 (1952).
(b) Third Party v. Employer Cases: Hill Lines, Inc. v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 222 F.2d
854 (C.A. 10th, 1955); Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 215 F.2d 368
(C.A. 10th, 1954); United Gas Corp. v. Guillory, 206 F.2d 49 (C.A. 5th, 1953); Slattery v.
Marra Bros., Inc., 186 F.2d 134 (C.A. 2d, 1951); Mikkelsen v. The Grandville, 101 F.Supp.
566 (E.D.N.Y., 1951), aff'd 191 F.2d 858 (C.A. 2d, 1952); Sientki v. Haffner, 145 F.Supp. 435
(S.D.N.Y., 1956); McCormick v. United States, 134 F.Supp. 243 (S.D. Tex., 1955); Ward
v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 119 F.Supp. 112 (D. Colo., 1954); Christie v. Powder Power Tool
Co., 124 F.Supp. 693 (D.D.C., 1954); Miranda v. Galveston, 98 F.Supp. 245 (D. Tex., 1951);
Portel v. U.S., 85 F.Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y., 1949); Johnson v. United States, 79 F.Supp. 449
(D. Ore., 1948); Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Dean, 275 Wis. 236, 81 N.W.2d 486 (1957);
Beal v. Southern Union Gas Co., 62 N.M. 38, 304 P.2d 566 (1956); Lovette v. Lloyd, 236
N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1953); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C.
559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953); Hill v. Galveston, 241 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App., 1952); Fidelity
& Casualty Co. of New York v. Christenson, 183 Minn. 182, 236 N.W. 618 (1931); Groth v.
Masnakoff, 122 N.Y.S.2d 110 (S.Ct., 1953); Edwards v. Sophkirsh Holding Corp., 280
App.Div. 168, 112 N.Y.S.2d 219 (S.Ct., 1952). See also cases listed in 2 Larson, The Law of
Workmen's Compensation §76.21 n. 6 (1952). However, a few federal courts have allowed
contribution in admiralty cases. Coal Operators Cas. Co. v. United States, 76 F.Supp. 681
(E.D. Pa., 1948); The S.S. Samovar, 72 F.Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal., 1947); Rederii v. Jarka Corporation, 26 F.Supp. 305 (S.D. Me., 1939) [The authority of the Coal Operators, Samovar, and
Rederii cases has undoubtedly been weakened by Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403
(C.A. 3d, 1951). See Barber S.S. Lines v. Quinn Bros., 104 F.Supp. 78 (D. Mass., 1952).] See
also Portal v. United States, 85 F.Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y., 1949) and The Tampico, 45 F.Supp.
174 (W.D.N.Y., 1942). Cf. Congressional Country Club v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 194 Md.
533, 71 A.2d 696 (1950) (contribution allowed since injured employees were not deemed to be
within the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act). Three courts have allowed contribution to the extent of the compensation award. Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403
(C.A. 3d, 1951), reversed on other grounds sub nom. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship C. & R.
Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952); Eledge v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 230 N.C. 584,55 S.E.2d 179
(1949); Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940). Indemnity has been allowed only under
special circumstances: (1) where the employer was "actively" negligent and the third party
was "passively" negligent, United States v. Rothschild Int. Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181
(C.A. 9th, 1950); American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (C.A. 8th, 1950). But cf.
Slattery v. Marra Bros., Inc., 186 F.2d 134 (C.A. 2d, 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915 (1951);
Sientki v. Haffner, 145 F.Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y., 1956); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending &
Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953); (2) where there is an express contract of indemnity, Brown v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 16 (C.A. 3d, 1954); Porello v.
United States, 153 F.2d 605 (C.A. 2d, 1946); Johnson v. United States, 133 F.Supp. 613
(E.D.N.C., 1955); Severn v. United States, 69 F.Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y., 1946); Green v. War
Shipping Administration, 66 F.Supp. 393 (E.D.N.Y., 1946); Clements v. Rockefeller, 189
Misc. 885, 70 N.Y.S.2d 149 (S.Ct., 1947); (3) where there is a separate duty based on the
special legal relationship of the employer and third party, Rich v. United States, 177 F.2d 668
(C.A.2d, 1949); Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218 (C.A. 2d, 1941); Farm Bureau
Mut. Auto I. Co. v. Kohn Bros. Tobacco Co., 141 Conn. 539, 107 A.2d 406 (1955); Baugh v.
Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d. 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944); (4) where there is a separate implied promise to
use due care, Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., Inc., 355 U.S. 563
(1958); Ryan Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); Barber S. S. Lines v. Quinn
Bros., 104 F.Supp. 78 (D. Mass., 1952); Westchester Light Co. v. Westchester County Small
Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938); cf. Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206

F.2d 784 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
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employers the courts have generally refused to admit the defense of contributory negligence. 3 They have reasoned that since the employer is not suing
in his own right, but rather as the subrogee of the non-negligent employee, the
employer's negligence should not be in issue.4 And, where the third party has
attempted to implead or bring an action over against the employer, the courts
have usually interpreted the "exclusive remedy" clause5 of the compensation
act as granting immunity to the employer. 6 A few courts have reached the
same result on the ground that there can be no contribution between joint
tortfeasors7 Most writers, however, have objected to holding the third party
solely liable, suggesting instead a more "equitable" distribution of the risk.,
The desire for a sharing of the liability between the employer and the third
party seems to stem from the general desire for contribution among joint tortfeasors. However, a unique problem is raised when the liability of one of the
concurrent wrongdoers to the injured party is limited by the exclusive remedy
2 Three states (Ohio, New Hampshire and West Virginia) have no subrogation provisions
in their compensation acts. For the different types of subrogation statutes see notes 23, 24, 25,
28 and 29 infra.
3See note 1(a) supra.
4 If the injured employee had been contributorily negligent, the third party could raise this
negligence as a defense to an action by the subrogated employer, e.g., Globe Indemnity Co. v.
Hook, 46 Cal.App. 700, 189 Pac. 797 (1920); Metropolitan Milk Co. v. Minneapolis St. Ry.
Co., 149 Minn. 181, 183 N.W. 830 (1921); Brown v. Southern Ry. Co., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E.
419 (1933).
5 A typical "exclusive remedy" clause provides: "The liability of an employer prescribed by
the last preceding section shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever, to
such employee, his personal representatives, husband, parents, dependents or next of kin, or
anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages, at common law or otherwise on account of such
injury or death .... " N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law (McKinney, 1946) §11.
6See note 1(b) supra. It has been argued that since the exclusive remedy provision
was incorporated in the act to compensate the employer for his absolute liability to the employee, and since the employer has not relinquished his common law rights and defenses against
the third party tortfeasor, the employer's immunity from suit should not be extended to third
party actions. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §76.52 (1952). See Westchester
Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E. 567 (1938).
It would appear, however, that this argument presupposes the conclusion. The employer might
well be deemed to have assumed absolute liability in exchange for immunity from third party
suits as well as from employee suits.
7 E.g., Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Cement, 215 F.2d 368 (C.A. 10th, 1954); cf.
Portal v. United States, 85 F.Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y., 1949); Coal Operators Cas. Co. v. United
States, 76 F.Supp. 681 (E.D. Pa., 1947). However, it is generally held that the parties are not
"joint tortfeasors" since "joint torfeasors" must all be liable to the injured person. See Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953); Lovette v.
Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1952).
8 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §76.53 (1952); 27 Rocky Mountain L.
Rev. 106, 108 (1954), noting Ward v. Denver & R.G.W.R., 119 F.Supp. 112 (D. Colo., 1954);
Workmen's Compensation-Contributory Negligence of Employer of Injured Employee as
Bar to Action against Third-Party Tortfeasor, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 549, 555 (1952); Recent
Developments in Iowa Workmen's Compensation Law Where Negligent Third Parties Are
Concerned, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 84, 95 (1951); Risk of Contribution under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 51 Col. L. Rev. 789 (1951).
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provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act. One writer has suggested that
it is inequitable to make the third party bear the entire loss simply because
his co-wrongdoer happened to be covered by a compensation act.9 On the
other hand, it could be argued that it is unfair to deny the employer the
benefits of the exclusive remedy provision simply because another person's
negligence happened to contribute to the employee's injury. Since arguments
on this level seem to reach an impasse, it would appear to be more profitable
to consider the employee's interest, which, though formerly ignored in connection with this problem, does form a predominant concern of the compensation
acts.
In a suit by the subrogee-employer against the third party, a change in the
law would enable the latter to seek contribution ° through set-off," counterclaim12 or subsequent action. However, since under the present acts the employee is entitled to the excess from the employer's suit, usually the amount
of the judgment minus the compensation award and expenses of the suit,1 3 the

question arises as to whether the third party's claim should be considered in
determining the excess.
If the claim is considered and the excess is thus computed after the claim
has been deducted from the employer's judgment, 14 whenever the judgment
exceeds the amount of the compensation award and expenses of suit the employee will be bearing at least part of the cost of the employer's negligence. 15
92 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §76.53 (1952).
10 In making the computations in this comment (see notes 14-18 infra) it is assumed that
contribution under the new law would be determined in the same manner as it is in contribution
statutes. E.g., Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1950) §2212. Thus where an employer and third
party are concurrently negligent the "moiety rule" would apply.
" Failure to Assert Claim by Set-off, 8 A.L.R. 694 (1920) and cases cited therein.
n2Rest., Judgments §58 (1942). The third party's claim would probably be a compulsory
counterclaim in a federal court. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 13(a).
13E.g., Delaware Ann. Stat. (1953) c. 19, §2363 provides: "Any recovery against such third
person in excess of the compensation theretofore paid and thereafter payable by the employer,
less the cost of securing and collecting same, shall be paid forthwith when collected, to the
employee or his dependents." Several states have variations of the "excess" rule. A Massachusetts statute provides that if the employer brings the action the employee gets four-fifths of the
excess. Mass. Laws Ann. (1949) c. 152, §15. New York's statute provides that two-thirds of the
excess goes to the employee. N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law (McKinney, 1946) §29(2).
Oregon's statute gives the employee a minimum of twenty-five per cent of the judgment. Oregon Rev. Stat. (1955) §656.322. Arkansas requires that the employee get at least one-third.
Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §81-1340. Montana limits the employer's rights to one-half of the
gross amount. Mon. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §92-204. Arizona denies the employee any interest
in the proceeds; however, the employer can only recover the amount of the compensation
award and costs. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1956) §23-1023.
14 E.g., if the award and expenses were 10, and the employer's judgment were for 30, the
third party's claim would be 15, and the "excess" would be 5.
11E.g., if the award and expenses were 10, and the employer's judgment were for 16, the
third party's claim would be 8. The employee would receive no excess, whereas if the law had
not been changed, 6 of the third party's claim of 8 would be deemed excess and inure to the
employee.
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Whenever the judgment is at least twice the compensation award and expenses, the employee would be bearing the full cost. 16 It is only when the
judgment exceeds twice the award and expenses that the employee would
receive any excess. 17
On first impression it might appear preferable to compute the employee's
excess without regard to the third party's claim. However, this would be even
worse from the point of view of the employee. Under this method it would be
economically disadvantageous for the employer to recover a judgment for
more or less than the amount of the award plus expenses,' 8 and since it is
difficult to obtain a judgment for the precise sum desired, the employer will
attempt to settle out of court for the amount of the award plus expenses.' 9 He
would have little difficulty in doing so in view of the smallness of compensation
awards as contrasted with common-law judgments for the same injury. 0 As a
result, there would probably never be any excess for the employee.
Thus, where subrogation occurs the employee will probably suffer by a
change in the law. And subrogation will occur whenever the employer can
obtain it since it will always be economically advantageous for him. This is
due to the fact that if the employee sues, the employer, under the recommended change of law, would be subject to an action over by the third party,
and there is no theory by which the employee could be forced to pay any of
the third party's claim. On the other hand, if the employer sues, the third
party's claim would be at least partially satisfied out of what would have been
16E.g., if the award and expenses were 10, and the employer's judgment were for 20, but for
the change in the law the third party's claim of 10 would inure entirely to the employee.
17 The compensation award plus expenses is assumed to be 10.
Employer's
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10
11

10
11

0
1

1 The compensation award plus expenses is assumed to be 10.
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5
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2
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would appear that the employer's settlement will not be open to attack. For example,
in Sparks v. Huber Baking, 48 Del. 9, 18, 96 A.2d 456, 461 (1952) the court stated that "the
employee has no right to complain that settlement was made at an amount which would yield
him nothing .... The primary purpose of the subrogation provisions.., is to give a compensating employer a means of recouping his loss.. . ." Accord: Johanson v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98 (1944); Silvia v. Scotten, 32 Del. 295, 122 Atl. 513 (1923).
Contra: Lovejoy Co. v. Ackis, 153 Fla. 876, 16 So.2d 297 (1944) [Florida's subrogation statute
requires court approval of settlements. Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943) §440.39(5)].
20
The third party would prefer not to settle only if he could be sure of a common-law judgment for less than twice the sum of the compensation award plus expenses. This is unlikely to
happen. See Katz and Wirpel, Workmen's Compensation 1910-1952: Are Present Benefits
Adequate? 4 Labor L. J. 167 (1953) and the discussion of common-law judgments for personal
injuries in Belli, The Adequate -ward, 39 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1951).
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the employee's excess if that excess is computed after the third party's claim
had been deducted; 21 and if the excess is computed without regard to the
22
third party's claim, that claim will be minimized.
It would seem that the employer will be able to obtain subrogation in a
majority of jurisdictions. He will always be able to do so in the "employer
priority" 23 and "absolute subrogation ' 24 states, and in the "election theory" 25
states he quite likely will be able to since employees often cannot afford to
wait for a common-law judgment.2 Also, in the "election theory," 27 "employee
priority" 28 and "no priority"2 9 states the employer will attempt to obtain a
subrogation option through contract. 30
However, even in those jurisdictions where the employer is unable to force
subrogation and the employee can exercise his right to sue the third party, a
change in the law would harm the employee. He would then have no choice
21 See

note 16 supra.

12 See

note 18 supra.

23 "Employer priority" statutes give the employer or his insurer the right to subrogate if

they so desire, and if they do not bring suit within a certain time, the employee may then proceed. Mass. Laws Ann. (1957) c. 152, §15; Maine Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 31, §25; Utah Code Ann.
(1953) §35-1-62.
24 "Absolute subrogation" statutes provide that the employee's cause of action is unconditionally assigned to the employer. Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950) §17.189; Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon,
Supp., 1957) §287.150; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952) §48-118; N.C. Code Ann. (1950) §97-10; Penn.
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp., 1957) c. 77, §671; S.C. Code Ann. (1952) §72-134; Va. Code Ann.
(1949) §65-38.
25"Election theory" statutes provide that if the employee chooses to take his compensation
award his employer is subrogated to his rights against the third party. Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1956)
§23-1023; Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953) §81-13-8; Del. Code Ann. (1953) c.19, §2363; Idaho Code
(1948) §72-204; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp., 1957) §40-1213; Ky. Rev. Stat. (Baldwin,
1955) §342.055; Md. Code Ann. (1957) c. 101, §58; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §176.06; N.M.
Stat. Ann. (1953) §59-10-25; Nev. Rev. Stat. (1955) §656.322; N.D. Rev. Stat. (1943) §650109; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1951) c. 85, §44; S.D. Code (1939) §64.0301; Tex. Civil Stat. Ann.
(Vernon, 1956) c. 8307, §6a; Vt. Rev. Stat. (1947) §8078; Wash. Rev. Code (1951)
§51.24.010; Wyo. Stat. Ann. (1945) §72-108.
6 The advancement of money to clients is disapproved by the American Bar Association.
See Opinions of the Commission on Personal Grievances, ABA Opinion No. 288 (1954).
27 See note 25 supra.
218
"Employee priority" statutes give the employee the right to receive the compensation
award and proceed against the third party. If he does not bring suit within a certain time the
employer or his insurer may proceed with the action. Ala. Code (1955) c. 26, §312; Ark. Stat.
Ann. (Supp., 1957) §81-1340; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 48, §138.5; Iowa Code Ann. (1949)
§85.22(2); Kan. Stat. Ann. (Supp., 1957) §44-504; Mont. Rev. Code (1947) §92-204; N.J.
Stat. Ann. (Supp., 1957) §34:15-40(f); N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law (McKinney,
1946) §29(2); R.I. Gen. Laws (1957) §28-35-58; Tenn. Code Ann. (1955) §50-914.
29 "No priority" statutes provide that either the employer or the employee can sue. Cal.
Code Ann. Lab. (Deering, 1953) §3852; Conn. Rev. Stat. (Supp., 1955) §3040(d); Fla.
Stat. Ann. (1943) §440.39(2); Ga. Code Ann. (1948) §114-403; La. Rev. Stat. (West, 1950)
§23:1101; Miss. Code Ann. (1952) §6998-36; Wis. Stat. Ann. (West, 1955) §102.29(1).
30 Such a contract provision would probably be held valid in light of the interpretation given
to subrogation statutes. See note 19 supra.
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but to bring the suit himself whereas previously he could profitably have
allowed the employer to subrogate. If the employer brings the action through
house counsel or a retained lawyer the employee, in effect, secures an attorney
at a lower cost. If the employee brings the action and hires counsel on a retained basis he takes the chance of paying fees in cases that are lost. If he attempts to avoid this by hiring a contingent fee lawyer he must pay a higher
fee for the cases won as compensation for the lawyer's assumption of the risk
of loss. The employer's retained lawyer receives less than a contingent fee
lawyer for the cases he wins, because he also is assured a fee in the cases he
loses. However, when the employer sues, the employee pays legal expenses
only if the suit is won since expenses are paid only by a reduction of the excess of a judgment over the award. 31
Some of the foregoing problems could be avoided if contribution were determined on the basis of the compensation award rather than on the basis of the
employer's judgment. If the employee's excess were computed without regard
to the third party's claim, there would no longer be any reason for the subrogee-employer to attempt to limit his judgment to the amount of the compensation award and expenses. 32 Moreover, determining contribution on the
basis of the compensation award would not be violative of the exclusive
remedy clause. However, if the employee's excess were computed after the
third party's claim had been deducted from the employer's judgment, the
employee will still be bearing the cost of the employer's negligence whenever
the judgment exceeds the amount of the compensation award and expenses of
suit.8" But, even if the excess is computed without regard to the third party's
claim, it would appear that any such formula would make only a minor contribution towards a more "equitable" distribution of the risk since, at present,
common-law judgments so far exceed compensation awards.3 4 Furthermore, in
1However, the employer must defray the costs of those suits which he or his insurer, as
subrogee, bring but lose. At least a part of this cost will be defrayed by lowered salaries to the
employees. This part is thereby distributed to all of the employees rather than being borne
entirely by the injured employee who brings his own suit.
32The employer's reimbursement would not be decreased by an increase in the size of his
judgment. For example, assuming the compensation award to be 10 and contribution to be
50 per cent of the compensation award.
Employer's
Judgment
6
10
20
30

Excess to
Employee
0
0
10
20

Third Party's
claim
5
5
5
5

Employer's
Reimbursement
1
5
5
5

" E.g., assuming the compensation award to be 10 and contribution to be 50 per cent of the
compensation award.
Employer's
Judgment
20
30
40

34 See note 20 supra.

Third Party's
Claim
5
5
5

Employer's
Net
15
25
35

Excess to
Employee
5
15
25
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a great many instances, regardless of the formula of contribution, a change in
the law would have no practical consequences.
Concurrent negligence is most likely to occur when parties are working
closely together for extended periods of time. And this occurs most often because of a contractual relationship between the parties or separate contracts
with a third person. No doubt the most recurring examples involve coemployees. But in these situations suit is seldom brought,3 5 since the coemployee is often substantially judgment proof and many states expressly exclude co-employees from the category of third persons.36 A majority of the
litigated cases, 37 however, involve contractual relationships 38 which enable the
parties to shift costs. Over two-thirds of these cases 39 involve the construction 40 and maritime shipping 4' businesses where an employee of a sub-contractor is injured by the concurrent negligence of his employer and the prime contractor 42 (in the construction business) or the ship owner 43 (in the maritime
cases) or the concurrent negligence of his employer and another subcontractor.44 In the former instances the prime bears the full risk under the present

law. If the law were changed part of this risk would be shifted to the subemployer, but by increasing his bids to account for this increased insurance
31 There are only two reported cases. Groth v. Masnakoff, 122 N.Y.S.2d 110 (S.Ct., 1953);
Thornton Bros. Co. v. Reese, 188 Minn. 5, 246 N.W. 527 (1933). Where the co-employee was
the sole tortfeasor, he has been sued a number of times. See cases cited in 2 Larson, The Law of
Workmen's Compensation §72.20 nn. 16, 17, 18, 19 (1952).
3e E.g., Ala. Code (Supp., 1955) c. 26, §312; Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953) §81-13-8; N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law (McKinney, 1946) §29(2); Okla. Stat. Ann. (1951) c. 85, §44; Utah
Code Ann. (1953) §35-1-62.
37Out of the 88 reported cases there was a contractual relationship in 60.
38 (a) Construction Company Cases: (1) Employer-Sub-contractor and Third Party-Prime
contractor, e.g., Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller & Paine, 240 Fed. 376 (C.A. 8th, 1917); Aetna
Casualty & S. Co. v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 140 F.Supp. 579 (W.D. La., 1956); General
Box Co. v. Missouri Utilities Co., 331 Mo. 845, 55 S.W.2d 442 (1932); (2) Employer-Prime
Contractor and Third Party Sub-contractor, e.g., Cyr v. F.S. Payne Co., 112 F.Supp. 526
(D. Conn., 1953); Utley v. Taylor & Gaskin, 305 Mich. 561, 9 N.W.2d 842 (1943); (3)
Employer-Sub-contractor and Third Party-Sub-contractor, e.g., Sparks v. Huber Baking Co.,
48 Del. 9, 96 A.2d 456 (1953); Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1953). (b)
Admiralty Cases: Longshoremen and Harbor Worker Employers and Third Party Shipowners, e.g., Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (C.A. 3d, 1953); Mikkelson v. The
Granville, 101 F.Supp. 566 (E.D.N.Y., 1951), aff'd 191 F.2d 858 (C.A. 2d, 1952). (c) Miscellaneous Employer-Independent Contractor cases: e.g., Ward v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 119
F.Supp. 112 (D. Colo., 1954); Nyquist v. Batcher, 235 Minn. 491, 51 N.W. 2d 566 (1952);
Employers Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Refiner Syrups. S Corp., 184 Misc. 941, 53 N.Y.S.2d 835
(S.Ct., 1945), aff'd 269 App.Div. 930, 58 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1946). (d) Miscellaneous Contract
Cases: e.g., Graham v. Lincoln, 106 Neb. 305, 183 N.W. 569 (1921); Fidelity & Casualty v.
Cedar Valley Electric Co., 187 Iowa 1014, 174 N.W. 709 (1919).
3'42 out of the 60 cases involving a contractual relationship.
10See note 38(a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3) supra.
41 See note 38(b) supra.
41See note 38(b) supra.

"See note 38(a)(1) supra.

44See note 38(a)(3) supra.
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cost the shift would be negated. In the latter instance under the present law,
the entire risk is theoretically borne by the sub-third party. In actuality, however, this risk is shifted to the prime. If the law were changed, part of this risk
would be shifted to the sub-employer. But, since the sub-employer would in
turn shift this risk to the prime, the situation would be substantially the same
as if the law had not been changed.
In many of the other cases where a change in the law would be reflected in
a change in risk distribution, it would appear that this result is of questionable
desirability. These cases involve a public utility in the role of the third
party,4 6 and due to the relatively inelastic demand curve of public utilities
they are usually in a better position than non-utility employers to pass on the
insurance cost to the general public.
It appears that not only would employees tend to be harmed by a significant
change, but such a change would often fail to achieve the desired result of
shifting the risk. Thus it would seem unwise to change the present law.
11In the construction business the prime contractor includes his insurance cost in the bid he
submits to the owner. If the law were changed, the prime's insurance costs would be reduced
in proportion to his reduced risk. On the other hand, the insurance costs of the sub-contractor
will be raised proportionately. Since the increased insurance cost would affect all sub-contractors in the same field, e.g., plumbers, the sub-contractors would be able to increase their bids to
the primes without affecting their competitive position. The prime will be willing to contract
for the same quantity of business at the increased bids since the increase will merely offset the
decrease in insurance premiums applicable to sub-contracts. And since the ultimate bid to the
owner would not be affected by the change, the industry's demand curve would likewise not
ultimately be affected. It is possible, however, that after the risk is shifted to the sub via the
change in the law, and before the subs include the cost of the risk in their bids, the prime will
lower his prices and thereby theoretically increase the demand for his services. To meet the increased demand, the prime's need for the services of the subs will be increased. This should
cause the price of the sub's services to increase. Thus, even before the subs include the cost of
the risk shifted to them via the change in the law in their bids to the primes, the risk in effect
will be shifted back to the prime.
46E.g., United Gas Corp. v. Guillory, 206 F.2d 49 (C.A. 5th, 1953) (explosion of natural gas
injured the plaintiff-construction worker); Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co.,
145 La. 680, 82 So. 785 (1919) (fireman killed by coming into contact with high tension wire);
Fidelity & Casualty v. Cedar Valley Electric Co., 187 Iowa 1014, 174 N.W. 709 (1919) (telephone employee came into contact with improperly installed high tension wire).

THE HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR CO-CONSPIRATORS'
DECLARATIONS
The conspiracy charge, long established' as an important weapon of prosecution, 2 has lately been subject to severe judicial and scholarly criticism.3
1 See The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crimes or Protection of Individual
Defendants, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 276, 277 n. 5(1948).
20'Dougherty, Prosecution and Defense Under Conspiracy Indictments, 9 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 263 (1940).
3 See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-58 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring);
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404-5 (1957); Michael and Wechsler, Criminal
Law and Its Administration 673-77, 686 (1940); The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution
of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 Hary. L. Rev. 276, 277 n. 8 (1948).

